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What signals quality for digital startups seeking access to external finance? Analyzing a unique dataset 
from India, we investigate the impact of traditional quality signals (e.g., the founders’ years of experience, 
prior industry experience); networking signals (e.g., degrees from elite educational institutes, the breadth 
of an entrepreneurial team); and digital signals (e.g., the social media presence of the startup on multiple 
social media sites) on the access to venture capital financing. We find that while networking and digital 
signals positively impact access to financing, traditional human capital signals do not have any significant 
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Entrepreneurial startups play a fundamental role in the promotion of innovation and economic growth 
(Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Acs et al., 2008; Audretsch, 2007a and 2007b; Audretsch et al., 2009; Baumol, 
1996; Chavis et al., 2011; Cumming & Johan, 2014; Cumming et al., 2014; Fairlie & Chatterji, 2013; 
Klapper & Love, 2011; Marcotte, 2012; McMullen, 2011; Naude, 2010; Stam & Wennberg, 2009; Thurik 
et al., 2008). The creation of new entrepreneurial and innovative ventures requires capital financing and, as 
such, there is a large body of research looking into access to entrepreneurial finance for entrepreneurs and 
startups (Bhide, 1992; Bonini et al., 2012; Fossen, 2014; Nahata, 2008; Wang & Wang, 2012; Li et al., 
2016). We know that sustained financing can ensure high levels of growth and survival of new ventures 
(Cosh et al., 2009; Smallbone et al., 2003; Storey, 2016; Van Auken & Carter, 1989) while lack of financing 
can result in low levels of growth and an increased likelihood of failure (Alsos et al., 2006; Basu & Parker, 
2001). As financing is crucial for startups not only at the initial stages but also at the later stages for 
continued growth and survival, extant research has sought to determine the factors that play a significant 
role in access to finance, such as the human capital of the founders (Almus & Nerlinger, 1999; Colombo & 
Grilli, 2005; Cressy, 1996; Cumming & Johan, 2008a; Stuart & Abetti, 1990; Westhead & Cowling, 1995) 
and founders’ social networks (Goh et al., 2013; Hochberg et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2013) . 
Human capital plays a significant role in entrepreneurial endeavors. Researchers have divided human 
capital into two broad categories: formal and informal. Formal signifies individual educational 
qualifications, skills, and abilities, whereas informal signifies human capital developed through work and 
familial experiences. We know that educational investments and work experience can translate into 
economic advantages (Becker, 1964; Killeen et al., 1999; Langelett, 2002) and, if applied towards an 
entrepreneurial activity, can result in improved entrepreneurial judgment (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Corbett, 
2005; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000; Parker, 2006; Ronstadt, 1988; Shane, 2000; Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2003) and forecasting ability (Clement, 1999; Mikhail et al., 1997). It is clear that the impact of human 
capital on entrepreneurial activity and judgment has been previously widely studied in more developed 
economies. There is however limited empirical evidence on the role of human capital in startup financing 
for firms in developing or emerging markets where institutions are arguably weaker, and informal quality 
signals are much more important to mitigate information asymmetry. In this paper we analyze Indian tech 
startups to determine the extent formal and informal human capital signals serve as positive signals to 
mitigate information asymmetries and potentially impact access to venture capital (VC) for Indian 
entrepreneurs. Our formal and informal measures include total years of experience, the type of work 
experience (technical, founder, or consultant), the degree to which an elite educational institute provides 
access to a network of resources, and the breadth of the entrepreneurial team. 
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In India, technology has been a major driver of innovation for the last 25 years. Major business 
opportunities have surfaced in the technological front; consequently, there has been exponential growth in 
the number of startups, which has attracted investments from a large number of venture capitalists (VCs). 
From 2012-2017, reports show a significant increase in investments by VCs in Indian startups. The 
transaction value has increased over 13.5 times (from $94 million in 2011 to $1.275 billion in 2016)1. In 
2017, investments by VCs in the country reached record levels at $26.5 billion.  
With such rapid growth, policymakers face considerable challenges. One challenge is mitigating 
the inefficiency of the matching process between investors and new technological startups, especially in a 
financial market which still largely remains imperfect (e.g. Colombo & Grilli, 2005, 2009). In India, 
graduates from top engineering colleges are no longer restricted to only joining the corporate world; thus, 
those with engineering, mathematical, and analytical skills are increasingly incentivized to create their own 
entrepreneurial firms. A report published by NASSCOM2 states that 50% of the founders of new firms have 
engineering backgrounds, 25% of them have management backgrounds, and 25% have other educational 
qualifications. In 2018, nearly half of the startups in India had one or more founders who studied in one or 
more of the country’s top four engineering and management colleges: the IITs3, IIMs4, BITS5, or the Indian 
School of Business6. In the United States, we observe the same trend in relation to Harvard, Stanford, and 
MIT7 according to Pitchbook8 and Crunchbase statistics. These considerations raise our initial question of 
whether the traditional human capital signal of previous work experience continues to signal quality to 
investors, as suggested by extant research. Our follow-up question is whether a degree from an elite 
institute, which may signal quality and increased social capital due to a higher probability of access to a 
 
1 PwC report 2016 
2 NASSCOM stands for the National Association of Software and Service Companies, a nonprofit organization 
established in 1988. It initiated a program called 10000 Startups in 2013. The purpose is to support the impact of 
10000 startups in India by 2023.  
See the full report at: https://smartnet.niua.org/sites/default/files/resources/nasscom-start-up-report-2017.pdf. 
3 Indian Institute of Technology, a premier engineering college. 
4 Indian Institute of Management, a premier business college. 
5 Birla Institute of Technology, a premier engineering college. 
6 See the full report on at: https://www.kalaari.com/magazine/india-tech-founders-does-alma-mater-matter 
7 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States of America. 
8 PitchBook Data, Inc. is a SAAS company founded in March, 2007. It delivers data, research, and technology covering 
the private capital markets. To collect data, it uses machine learning and natural language processing. The company's 
core product is the PitchBook Platform, a subscription-only database. 
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network of high quality and successful alumni and other social connections, results in greater ease of 
obtaining startup financing from VCs.  
We believe another key factor in gaining startup financing is digital network signaling, or using 
social networks to amass numbers of followers on multiple sites such as Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook. 
Prior research has already linked social capital to the propensity for investors to invest in the Australian 
crowdfunding context, and we seek to extend this research to our analysis of Indian technology startups 
(Ahlers et al., 2015). Startups and founders who successfully network and build relationships digitally with 
their consumers build a successful brand image, which serves as a positive signal to VCs. Previous studies 
have shown the effectiveness of social media in promoting word-of-mouth information diffusion (Aral et 
al., 2013; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas et al., 2007; Forman et al., 2008; Zhu & Zhang, 2010) in 
marketing goods and services (Aral et al., 2013; Bharadwaj et al., 2013) and by serving as a platform for 
greater consumer engagement and participation (Chen et al., 2015; Ghose & Han, 2011; Goes et al., 2014; 
Li & Wu, 2018; Miller & Tucker, 2013). In this study, we hand collect information from various social 
media networks (LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook) to determine the strength of the startup’s digital network 
and how it impacts a startup’s access to financing.  
By extending Crane & Hartwell (2019), we link signaling theory with human capital theory and 
social capital theory to test our developed hypotheses. We collected data from 102 startups that obtained 
funding between the years 2014-2017. To address potential survivorship bias, we included both failed and 
active startups. Our results are not only illuminating but also counter-intuitive. We find that the networking 
and digital signals evidenced by a degree from an elite educational institute (India or abroad), the breadth 
of the entrepreneurial team (number of founders), and the higher the social media fan following positively 
impacts access to finance. Founders’ years of experience, as well as their prior industry experience as a 
founder, more specifically their prior experience as technical engineers and consultants, do not show any 
impact on financing. These findings, related to traditional human capital signals, are rather unexpected as 
extant research (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Beckman et al., 2007; Burton, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 2001; 
Hsu, 2007) using data from developed countries (mainly the US and Europe) show contrasting results. 
These finding can have several implications for digital entrepreneurs, policymakers, and for VCs, especially 
in developing countries other than India.  
We believe that this study makes important contributions to the existing literature on VC financing 
(Audretsch et al., 2012; Baum & Silverman 2004; Cao & Hsu, 2011; Conti et al., 2013; Cumming & Johan, 
2014; Greenberg, 2013; Häussler et al., 2012; Hoenen et al., 2014; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Mann & Sager, 
2007; Cumming & Zhang, 2016), as this study is the first empirical study, to the best of our knowledge, 
which links human capital theory, social capital theory, and signaling theory to show the impact of human 
capital and social capital on obtaining VC financing in the developing market context.  
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The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. We begin by reviewing the relevant 
literature on signaling; the problems of asymmetry, human capital, and social networking; and then we use 
this research to develop our hypotheses and theoretical framework in Section 2. We describe the research 
method, data collection, and variables used to test the hypotheses in Section 3. We present our results of 
multivariate logistic regressions and our robustness tests in Section 4. We conclude and discuss the 
limitations of our research in Section 5. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Evans & Bahrami (1995) suggest that technological startups9 are prone to high levels of business risk, 
changing consumer preferences, fast-changing technology, and a shortened product life cycle. To establish 
themselves in such a complex and dynamic environment, startups need continued access to external 
financing as lack of adequate financing has been shown to increase the likelihood of failure (Aspelund et 
al., 2005; Carter & Van Auken, 2005; Cassar, 2004; Coleman, 2000; Gaskill et al., 1993; Sandberg & Hofer 
1987). Inadequate access to financing also affects the growth potential of new ventures. VC literature finds 
that under-capitalized firms experience lower levels of growth (Alsos et al., 2006; Chandler & Hanks, 
1998). A recent research report10 showed that more than 90% of startups fail. Similarly, in India, a study 
conducted by IBM found that more than 90% of startups in India fail in the first five years owing to lack of 
pioneering innovation and funding. New ventures in India may face heightened barriers to traditional 
sources of financing due to higher institutional burdens, resulting in opacity and information asymmetry 
that limits the availability of information (Cumming & Johan, 2008a; and 2013; De Clercq et el., 2010; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1995). Entrepreneurs and founders will have significant knowledge about the startup’s 
future prospects and growth, due to a higher level of involvement in the business, while the external investor 
is likely to possess more information regarding the marketing and trends in the industry in general. In such 
 
9 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry released a notification on April 1, 2015 that defines a startup as “an 
entity…identified as a startup.” 
•Up to five years from the date of incorporation.  
•If its turnover does not exceed [25 crores] (?) in the last five financial years. 
•If it is working towards innovation, development, deployment, and commercialization of new products, processes, or 
services driven by technology or intellectual property.” (Where does this quote begin?) 
For this study, we do not have information on turnover, so we use age and technological innovation as the main 
considerations.  
10 See: Marmer, M., Hermann B.L., & Berman R. (2011). Startup Genome Report 01, A new framework for 
understanding why startups succeed: http://www.wamda.com/web/uploads/ resources/Startup_Genome_Report.pdf. 
Accessed 20 April 2013. 
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cases, when there is a presence of asymmetric information, entrepreneurs may pursue a different strategy 
than what would be preferred by the investors (Gompers, 2002). It is difficult for investors to monitor ex-
post the behavior of entrepreneurs, as entrepreneurs may behave opportunistically after obtaining external 
financing (Cumming & Johan, 2007; 2008a, 2008b). Additionally, for the investors, it is difficult to 
ascertain ex-ante the risks and returns of the projects of firms that lack a track record and are developing 
innovative technologies. For startups, all of these factors create barriers to raising external financing, as 
they do not have a sufficient track record, credit history, or collateral with which they can use to alleviate 
such problems (MacMillan et al., 1985; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  
Factors that serve to breach the aforementioned barriers have been identified by researchers, the most 
significant being the founders’ human capital (Aspelund et al., 2005; Gimeno et al., 1997; MacMillan et 
al., 1985; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Human capital theory was initially applied to study the impact of 
education (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961) on economic value. Since then, the theory has been increasingly 
adopted in the field of entrepreneurship, consistently linking human capital attributes to entrepreneurial 
success (Unger et al., 2011). The literature on human capital distinguishes three kinds of human capital: 
generic (general) human capital, firm-specific human capital, and task-specific human capital (Gibbons & 
Waldman, 2004; Hatch & Dyer, 2004).  
While we do not directly distinguish between these particular subcategories of human capital in our 
paper, we do employ signaling theory to propose how traditional human capital signals (like having prior 
experience as a startup founder, a technical or software engineer, or a business consultant) and networking 
signals (such as possessing a degree from an elite educational institute, the breadth of an entrepreneurial 
team and the number of founders, and the entrepreneurial team’s years of experience) serve as quality 
signals to VCs to both mitigate information asymmetry and enhance the likelihood of access to multiple 
rounds of financing (Spence, 1973; and 1974). Additionally, we analyze a variable called digital signals, 
which represents the fan following of the startup on multiple social media sites (Twitter, Facebook, and 
LinkedIn) (Vismara, 2016). We believe the higher the number of “fan” followings, the more positive the 
signal of social capital to investors. Even though several empirical studies have analyzed the impact of 
founders' human capital on firms’ growth and performance, there are very few studies that have explored 
the impact of human capital on access to VC financing in India. Our theoretical model of the signaling 
impact of these factors is shown in Fig. 1. We consequently developed our hypotheses on the relationship 
between the founders’ human capital and the startups’ access to financing followed by our hypothesis on 




Fig1: Theoretical model showing the relationship of traditional, networking, and social media signals to 
attract more rounds of financing 
2.1 Traditional Signals: Entrepreneurial Experience 
 Entrepreneurship literature (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Corbett, 2005; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000; 
Parker, 2006; Ronstadt, 1988; Shane, 2000; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003) has shown that founders gain 
significant insight from their past work experiences thereby improving entrepreneurial judgment, greater 
task performance, and forecasting ability (Clement, 1999; Mikhail et al., 1997). This benefit of experience, 
generally, may be greater in settings of high uncertainty such as business opportunities in new technology 
or high-tech industries (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). However, other scholars argue against the benefit of 
experience for several reasons, including the heterogeneity across tasks that limits the transfer of gained 
knowledge (Bonner & Lewis, 1990), cognitive biases that inhibit effective learning (Cassar & Craig, 2009; 
Hogarth, 1991; Kahneman et al., 1982; Sexton et al. 1997), and the lack of sufficient task repetition to 
achieve learning by doing (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Beyond these theoretical debates, there are crucial 
practical and policy implications that determine whether or not years of experience do actually impact the 
entrepreneurship process. However, there is limited empirical evidence from research that directly 
investigates the role of years of experience on the access to financing for the new startups in this digital 
age. We believe that experienced entrepreneurs are likely to have a greater understanding of the industry 
and, given the greater uncertainty for high-tech businesses, the benefit from experience can serve as a 
positive signal to VCs. Consequently, we posit:  
 




2.1.2 Prior Startup Experience 
Studies have shown that investors look for founders with experience (Hall & Hofer, 1993; Kaplan 
& Stromberg, 2004; Maidique, 1986). Entrepreneurs who have prior experience creating startups develop 
strong cognitive skills that help them better assess risk (Bar-Hillel, 1983; Hayward et al., 2006) and which, 
overall, results in a better evaluation and selection of entrepreneurial opportunities (Baron & Ensley, 2006; 
Gruber et al., 2008). Prior startup founding experience can serve as a powerful human capital signal (Hsu, 
2007) and can increase the likelihood of obtaining VC funding. While founders may have been involved in 
several previous ventures, the frequency and repetition of startup founding experience will not necessarily 
always serve as a positive signal to investors. In contrast, Beckman et al. (2007) found prior startup 
experience had an opposite effect on receiving VC funding. Similarly, Baum & Silverman (2004) found 
that the yearly pre-IPO amount of VC funding obtained by Canadian biotech startups increases with the 
managerial competencies of a firm's president, while it is negatively related to his or her entrepreneurial 
experience. Consequently, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The prior startup experience of founders facilitates access to more rounds of VC financing.  
 
2.1.3. Prior Technical Experience or Industry Experience 
The founders who have had prior industry experience or possess technical skills related to the 
industry are aware of the industry norms, rules, and dynamics of every changing environment. Such 
founders with more technical experience and skills are better able to understand the needs of consumers 
and know how to serve them better (Delmar & Shane, 2006). Founders’ industry experience is often viewed 
positively (Brush et al., 2001) and is valued by potential VCs when making investment decisions 
(MacMillan et al., 1985). Eckhardt et al., (2006) also find similar results, where prior industry-specific 
experiences positively influence the likelihood of obtaining external financing. This can serve as a positive 
signal to investors who believe that industrial experience can serve them better. Consequently, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The prior technical experience of founders facilitates access to more rounds of financing 
through VC.  
 
2.1.4 Prior Business Consultancy Experience 
The role of an expert consultant has increasingly become significant for firms seeking to be 
successful. An event study by Bergh & Gibbons (2011) that analyses firms that announced the hiring of 
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consultants finds that the stock market, on average, responded positively and significantly to the 
announcement. There is, however, not much literature on the impact of prior business consultancy 
experience on the success of the venture or in obtaining successful VC financing. From our data, business 
consultancy appeared as the third most significant experience a founder should possess, which thus made 
us consider that a founder’s prior experience as a business consultant serves as a relevant signal to VCs. 
We believe that business consultants better understand the dynamics of the new industry, as they often 
consult projects that are short and cyclical in nature. They also have the skills to quickly understand the 
market requirements and market demands for their products. Additionally, they possess project 
management skills, are used to working under strict deadlines, and must master communication skills early 
in their careers, as they must often address the top executives of the companies. All these skills can be 
effectively used during new venture creation. Business consultants also know how to perform strategic, 
operational, and financial analyses for their clients. The above justifications lead to the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2c: Prior business consultancy experience of founders facilitates access to more rounds of VC 
financing. 
 
2.2. Networking Signals 
Extant literature defines a social network as a “web of personal connections and relationships for 
the purpose of securing favors in personal and/or organizational action” (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1997; 
Granovetter, 1985; Groh & Wallmeroth, 2016). Members of social networks are better able to access and 
exchange new knowledge, thus facilitating knowledge creation. In firms or organizational settings, social 
networks may involve relationships among individuals in a formal structure of business connections. For 
the purposes of our paper, we focus on social networks as an informal structure of personal relations bound 
by institutional space (Sorenson, 2003). We look to the quality of the network as certified by a degree from 
an elite educational system which not only legitimizes quality but also enables access to equally successful 
alumni. The extent of the network is measured by the size of the entrepreneurial team. 
 
2.2.1. A Degree From an Elite Educational Institute 
A degree from an elite educational institute is perceived as a quality signal. Engel & Keilbach 
(2007), using a sample of mostly private Germans firms, found that the education of the founders 
significantly influences the likelihood of receiving VC. Maidique (1986) established that VCs considered 
founders with advanced degrees from high-quality institutions to affect their startup success. Conversely, 
Audretsch & Lehmann (2004), employing a sample of 341 German startups listed in the Neuer Markt, 
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highlighted that the number of members of a firm's top management team with a Ph.D. degree had no impact 
on access to VC. Thus, the existing literature on this topic is quite inconclusive. Whilst most of the extant 
knowledge has been derived from and relevant to developed economies, the situation in developing 
economies still remains an open question. How does networking capital help the entrepreneur raise 
financing for a startup based in India? In particular, we are interested in knowing whether or not graduating 
from an elite educational institute increases the likelihood of financing compared to graduating from other 
non-elite educational institutes. We base our assertion on the fact that degrees from recognized elite 
institutes serves not only as a credibility signal to VCs in comparison to those who graduate from non-elite 
institutes but also signals that, throughout the time spent in higher education, a useful network of equally 
successful elites is established in an informal manner. Following this assertion, we build upon our first 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Indian startup founders with degrees from elite educational institutes are likely to attract 
more rounds of VC financing.  
 
2.2.2. The Entrepreneurial Team (The Number of Founders) 
Gartner et al. (1994) made the argument that the entrepreneur in entrepreneurship is typically plural, 
not singular. Growing literature (Ensley et al., 1998; ; Gartner et al., 1994; Lechler, 2001; Reich, 1987) on 
this topic has established the fact that the activities involved in establishing and growing a new venture are 
more often taken by entrepreneurial teams rather than by a solitary entrepreneur. By pooling founder’s 
talents, teams can resolve complex problems (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 
1992). Entrepreneurial teams are more likely to attract financial resources such as VC and traditional capital 
through banks (Beckman et al., 2007; Cooper & Daily, 1997). The size of the entrepreneurial team has been 
reported to have a positive association with venture performance in a variety of settings, as larger teams are 
likely to have more resources (Colombo & Grilli, 2005; Cooper & Bruno, 1977; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Feeser & Willard, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). We believe that a higher 
number of founders on the entrepreneurial team is beneficial as well in the context of India, where the 
startup ecosystem is not so friendly for new ventures and involves a lot of bureaucracy and administrative 
burden. Having a team of co-founders with complementary skill sets not only helps in sharing the burden 
of work but also enables startup access to the numerous co-founders’ networks. Accordingly, we expect 
that a higher number of founders should increase the startup’s social network capital. Consequently, we 
posit: 
Hypothesis 4: Indian startups that have more founders in their entrepreneurial team are likely to attract 




2.3 The Strength of Social Networking as a Digital Signal  
Podolny (2005) has proposed that “the greater market participants’ uncertainty about the underlying 
quality of a producer and the producer’s product, the more that market participants will rely on the 
producer’s status to make inferences about quality.” Startups can effectively use social media as a crucial 
medium not only for the exchange of information with clients but also to reduce information scarcity 
problems that exist between startups and investors. A startup’s social media presence and fan following 
could demonstrate the startup’s ability to lure consumers, strengthen its brand, and engage and retain 
consumers (Vismara, 2016). This, in turn, can serve as a positive signal to VCs and increase the likelihood 
of securing funding. Taken broadly, existing studies suggest (Goh et al., 2013; Luo et al., 2013) that the use 
of social media can influence overall firm performance, including the success of early-stage firms and their 
ability to obtain financing. While these studies mostly use data from established companies, we expect to 
see a similar logic at work for startup firms. With respect to signaling function, social networking may also 
serve as legitimization for the startup idea/product or process and, consequently, may facilitate the 
acquisition of financial capital. Thus, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Startups that have more followers (fans) on social media (Twitter/Facebook/LinkedIn) are 
more likely to receive more rounds of VC financing.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
3.1. Data Collection 
We collected data comprising 47 active startups and 55 failed startups from 2014–2017 through 
several online sources and random searches (Crunchbase11, Traxn12, Trak.in13, Inc4214 and Internet 
 
11 Crunchbase is an online database of startups and technological companies around the globe. The database provides 
information related to funding rounds. We used the paid version, Crunchbase Pro, which allowed access to data 
pertaining to Indian startups and their investment details. Crunchbase can be used by entrepreneurs, business analysts, 
researchers, and investors. https://www.crunchbase.com/. 
12 Traxn is a database providing information on nearly 10 million companies around the globe. It is a paid database 
considered to be very accurate and precise. https://tracxn.com/. 
13 Trak.in is an Indian blog that list the startup by years. Information, such as the names of startups that have utilized 
venture capital funding, is available. https://trak.in/Tags/Business/category/startup/. 
14 Inc.42 is a leading Indian media and information platform that is known for its coverage of Indian startup 
ecosystems. It publishes several reports and articles that offer information on startups that have filed for bankruptcies. 
This is a very useful platform for accessing information on Indian startups. https://inc42.com/. 
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specified word-based searches15). The Indian VC industry has passed through three distinct phases in the 
last decade: the growth stage, maturation and moderation, and renewed optimism. We analyzed data from 
2014-2017, as these years were marked with heavy investments in Indian startups, and, more specifically, 
with higher quality investments in digital startups. We included failed startups to avoid survivorship bias 
in our sample. T-tests indicated no significant differences between the 102 active startups and failed ones 
in terms of age, sector, and city. We selected only the technological startups in the domains of Consumer 
Internet services, Fintech, business analytics, Edtech, Foodtech, Healthtech, Logistics, and Enterprise 
Applications. We collected information related to total funds raised and multiple rounds of financing 
through the Crunchbase database, and we cross-checked the results with Traxn and with online media 
reports (Trak.in and Inc42) to check the accuracy of the data. We were also able to obtain information on 
the names of founders, which we then used on LinkedIn to collect more information related to human capital 
variables, such as previous experience (number of years of experience and kind of prior experience), 
educational institution, and gender. We then collected information related to the strength of the social media 
network of funded startups through LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter and added a combined variable of the 
total number of fan followers. We also collected information on the region of the startup, the year of launch, 
and the sector. A detailed analysis of the variables and from where they were collected is provided in the 
appendix (A1). Data collection ended in July 2018, therefore any data after that date go beyond the scope 
of our study.  
3.1.1. Dependent Variables 
To test the independent effects of human capital and social networking on access to financing, we 
use rounds of financing (FIN_ROUNDS)16 as our dependent variable. Based on the data collected for both 
active startups and failed startups, we found that only one startup was funded through debt. All of the other 
startups were funded initially through VC and, later, funded through both VC and private equity. We 
collected the information on the number of financing rounds starting from seed funding through to the last 
funding round as of July 2018, for both kinds of firms. We found that while the average round of funding 
received by successful firms was 3, for failed firms it was only 1. We also collected information on the total 
amount of financing raised as of July 2018. The average funding amount for the still-active startups was 
 
15 We searched for specific words like “technological startups from India,” “emerging startups,” “failed startups,” 
and so forth to build our database of 102 startups. We use random searches so data does not come from one Internet 
platform. 
16 Indian startups can be financed in stages. The process begins from the seed stage, which is the first level of raising 
capital, solely given on a concept or idea. Early stage investing is identified within Series A and Series B of financing 
rounds and is associated with the early stage and growth. The next round of financing is associated with expansion. 
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around US$300 million, whereas for failed firms it was $4 million. We needed to consider that in the case 
of failed startups, the details of the amount raised were absent for 20 startups. Being unable to utilize the 
amount of funding as the dependent variable, we employed rounds of financing. Only VC and private equity 
funds are included in our data sample and we do not include funds provided by the government or the 
founders.  
 
3.1.2. Independent Variables 
3.1.2.1. Founders' Human and Networking Capital 
We argue that the founders' human capital, particularly their years of prior experience and prior 
relevant experience––industry-related prior experience, previous founding experience, previous business 
consultancy experience, an educational degree from elite institute17, and the presence of an entrepreneurial 
team, rather than being a solo entrepreneur—sends signals about the quality of the founding members' 
productivity and effectiveness to VCs. We treat these types of human capital separately.  
We include an independent variable related to the total years of average experience (YEARS_EXP) 
of the founder and also included dummy variables related to relevant prior experience. Our descriptive 
statistics show that out of 214 founders, 36% of the founders have had prior experience as a founder, 21% 
have had prior experience as a software engineer, and 15% have had prior experience as a business 
consultant. The other 28% have had other prior experiences related to accounting, investing, and 
advocating, or have worked as a scientist or product and marketing manager. Consequently, we believe 
these skills (prior founder, prior technical, and prior business consultant) are significant for startups and 
help them to access financing. As such, we created dummy variables related to relevant experience: at least 
one founder has prior technical experience (ATLEAST_PRIORTECH_EXP), at least one founder has prior 
founding experience (ATLEAST_PRIORFOUNDER_EXP), and at least one founder has prior business 
consultant experience (ATLEAST_PRIORCONSULT_EXP) (Gimmon & Levie, 2010; Hsu, 2007). A 
degree from IIT, IIM, BITS, and foreign universities that are recognized elite institutes (DEG_ELITE) is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Out of the 214 founders in our data sample, nearly 
83% of them attended IIT, IIM, BITS PILANI, or an elite foreign university, and the rest attended other 
 
17 According to our data sample, 73% of the founders came from the Indian Institute of Technology (IITs), the Indian 
Institute of Management (IIM), the Birla Institute of Technology and Science (BITS) Pilani, or a foreign university 
like Harvard, Stanford, The Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, etc. We refer to reputable 
rankings that regard these as elite educational institutes. For example, Outlook magazine regards IITs and BITS as the 
top-ranked Engineering colleges in India: https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/top-100-engineering-




educational institutes in India. As such, we believe attendance at one of these institutes should result in 
better access to financing rounds.  
We include an entrepreneurial team as depicted by the variable number of founders 
(NO_OF_FOUNDERS). The presence of an entrepreneurial team has been shown to positively impact 
venture performance (Colombo & Grilli, 2005; Cooper & Bruno, 1977; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Feeser & Willard, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Our descriptive statistics present only 24 solo 
entrepreneurs; in this regard, we consider this an important variable that impacts access to financing.  
 
3.1.2.2. Social Networking  
We include variable social networking (SOCIAL_NETWORK) to determine the impact of social 
networking, or digital signals as represented by the number of fan followers, on multiple social media sites 
with access to financing. The social networking variable takes value from the social media sites of each 
startup, such as Twitter (the number of followers), LinkedIn (the number of connections), and Facebook 
(the number of fans). We add them all together to determine the strength of their digital networking. The 
average number of connections for active startups is around 218,870 and for failed startups is only 72,380. 
We believe that founders of failed startups were not able to gather strength on their social media profiles, 
which could have been interpreted as a negative digital signal by the investors. We believe that social media 
strength plays a very important role for not only creating brand awareness or marketing products but also 
to gain traction and help access subsequent rounds of financing.  
 
3.1.3. Control variables 
We controlled for certain variables that might impact the rounds of financing. First, we controlled 
for geographic location (Blau, 1977; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) to account for spatial proximity to VCs 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Geographical distribution of these startups, according 
to the data, was as follows: 26 are located in Bangalore, 47 in the Northern Capital Region (NCR), 16 in 
Mumbai, and the remainder in other cities in India. Consequently, we coded this variable 1 for startups 
located in premium cities for investments (e.g., Bangalore, NCR, and Mumbai) (Florida & Kenney, 1988; 
Chatterji et al., 2014) and 0 for ventures located in other areas. We have three dummy variables: 
City_Bangalore, City_NCR, and City_Mumbai. These cities are of strategic importance, as Bangalore is 
known as the Silicon Valley of India and home to many technology startups; Mumbai is known as the 
financial capital and home to many fintechs; and the NCR region is also developing into a home to many 
new technology startups. Second, we controlled for the age of the startup, as investors may prefer to invest 
in more established startups that have established market positions (Hsu, 2007; Shane & Stuart, 2002). 
Finally, we control for industry, by creating dummy variables for industry based on our descriptive 
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statistics. The following dummy variables represent the different sectors of technology startups: consumer 
internet (CONSUMER_INTERNET), healthtech (HEALTHTECH), edtech (EDTECH), and fintech 
(FINTECH). Additional control variables related to founder’s gender was also included in the regression 
model, as our descriptive statistics suggest a huge gender bias, where women only represent 8 percent of 
214 founders. The detailed descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. To avoid biased results given 




We used SPSS statistical software to test the main empirical hypotheses discussed in the previous 
sections; this section includes two steps. First, we estimated a regression model to predict the number of 
financing rounds (FIN_ROUNDS) as a function of the various independent variables and control variables 
discussed earlier. Post hoc multicollinearity diagnostics indicated variance inflation factors (VIFs) well 
below the threshold of 5 for all the independent variables tested. However, for rigor and robustness, based 
on the observed correlation matrix, we also ran structural equation modelling (SEM) with explicit 
covariance paths for all a priori statistically significant correlations (observed and expected) between the 
independent variables. This ability of SEM to explicitly handle multicollinearity is one of its important 
advantages compared to traditional ordinary least square (OLS) multiple regression. 
Based on the hypothetical factors that could explain the number of financing rounds of startups in India, 
our multiple regression model (Model 1) contains all the independent variables of the study to test for the 
predicted signal. It is as follows:  
 
 
(1) FIN_ROUNDSi = β0 + β1SOCIAL_NETWORKi  + β2AGEi + β3NO_OF_FOUNDERSi + β4YEARS_EXPi 
+ β5DEG_ELITEi + β6ATLEAST_PRIORFOUNDER_EXPi + β7ATLEAST_PRIORTECH_EXPi + 
β8ATLEAST_PRIORCONSULT_EXPi + β9GENDERi + β10CONSUMER_INTERNETi + 
β11EDTECHi + β12HEALTHTECHi + β13FINTECHi + β14CITY_NCRi + β15CITY_BANGALOREi + 
β16CITY_MUMBAIi + εi.,      
 
 
To further understand the relative contributions of the various predictors, we also ran 4 more regression 
models. Model 2 excluded the variable SOCIAL_NETWORK, Model 3 excluded NO_OF_FOUNDERS, 
Model 4 excluded DEG_ELITE, and Model 5 excluded all control variables to observe whether or not these 





3.2.1. Supplementary Analyses for Robustness and Cross-Validation 
We empirically tackled the theoretical model presented in Fig. 1 using structural equation modelling (SEM) 
as a robustness test. As mentioned earlier, the advantage of using SEM instead of the combination of 
aggregate scores from the factor analysis and traditional regression models with multiple inputs is that a) it 
allows for explicit handling of multicollinearity through covariance paths, unlike multiple regressions, and 
b) measurement error is not aggregated in a residual error term. Further the evaluation of the models is 
based on a diverse set of fit indices including absolute, relative, and comparative fit indices as well as 
information like the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian Information Criterion. One common 
rule-of-thumb for implementing SEM is that it should have an a priori minimum threshold of 100 subjects 
(Williams et al., 2004) and a post hoc Hoelter’s N of 75-200; our sample meets these thresholds: (n=102; 
Hoelter’s N = 139 (95% confidence) and 152 (99% confidence). Unstandardized and standardized 
coefficients estimates are presented in the following Results section in order to allow multiple perspective 
comparisons with the conventional regression model, as well as to compare relative contributions (effect 
sizes) of the various independent and control variables. 
 
4. RESULTS  
 
Table 1 and Table 2 reports the bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics, respectively, for the 
variables in the analysis. Significant correlations were found between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables “Educational Institute,” “Number of Founders,” and “Social Network.” Correlation 
analysis results indicate weak levels (<.3) of correlations between all independent variables except 
“Educational Institute” and “Prior founder experience,” where we observe strong significant correlation 
(0.340). Further, we examined multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIF). The general rule of 
thumb is that VIFs exceeding 10 are a sign of serious multicollinearity. The VIF value for all studied 
variables is < 3.0 (maximum value of 2,972), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a major concern (Hair 
et al., 2010). A strong negative and significant correlation was found between sector and city control 
variables. To eliminate possible collinearity problems and more than verify the VIF values, we performed 




Table1: Nonparametric correlations - Kendall's tau_b (1 dependent and 16 independent variables, 2-tailed) 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
























.074 .087 .153 .012 .064 .087 1.00           
8 Age .121 .093 .063 .187** .039 .159 .144 1.00          
9 Social Network .357** .013 .071 .116 -.020 -.074 .124 .125 1.00         
10 Gender .058 .089 .012 -.084 .144 .109 -.030 .007 -.101 1.00        
11 City Bangalore .079 .102 .051 .056 .201* .148 .054 .016 -.032 .035 1.00       
12 City NCR -.004 .065 .040 .044 -.061 -.047 .031 .026 -.047 .015 -.541** 1.00      
13 City Mumbai -.039 .093 .021 -.024 -.054 .042 -.051 -.090 .045 -.012 -.252* -.399** 1.00     
14 Consumer Internet .031 .091 .026 .108 -.056 -.082 -.010 -.081 .031 .083 -.242* .214* -.077 1.00    
15 Fintech -.039 .085 .107 .005 .046 .204* .170 .141 .064 -.037 .056 -.080 .056 -.372** 1.00   
16 HealthTech .006 -.090 -.176 .076 -.074 -.118 -.193 .119 .060 -.056 .080 -.123 -.026 -.349** -.091 1.00  
17 Ed tech -.033 .038 .053 -.013 .031 .222* -.095 .059 .060 -.078 .019 -.095 .203* -.324** -.084 -.079 1.00 
                   
 Due to the binary nature of some variables, these correlations should be interpreted with care.        




Table 2: Descriptive statistics related to active vs. failed startups 
 Total Mean Active Startups 
Mean 
Failed Startups Mean  
 
   
Rounds of Financing 1.82 (1.28) 2.34 (1.55) 1.38 (0.76) 
Average Funding  300, 062,191 4, 678,571 
Elite Educational Institute 73% 74% 58% 
Other Educational Institutes 27% 26% 42% 
Prior Technical Experience 21% 20% 21% 
Prior Founders Experience 36% 38% 32% 
Prior Consultants Experience 15% 15% 16% 
Other Prior Experiences 28% 27% 29% 
Years of Experience 12.01 (5.92) 12.93 (5.03) 11.22 (6.54) 
Average no. of founders 2.10 (1.08) 2,32 (1.27) 1.91 (0.84) 
Bangalore 25% 34% 18% 
NCR 46% 38% 53% 
Mumbai 16% 15% 16% 
Other cities 13% 13% 13% 
Male founders  92% 95% 88% 
Female founders 8% 5% 12% 
Consumer Internet 59% 45% 71% 
Fintech 9% 13% 5% 
Healthtech 8% 15% 2% 
Edtech 7% 13% 2% 
Others 17% 16% 20% 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Total n = 102; Active n = 47; Failed n = 55. 
The main results of our regressions analysis are summarized in Table 3. Table 3 displays the unstandardized 
coefficients (beta and standard error), the standardized beta and sig., the number of observations, the F and 
sig., and the R² and adjusted R² for each model.  
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These analyses (ANOVA) resulted in 4 statistically significant models (Models 1, 3, 4, and 5). Model 1 is 
the model that includes all variables [F(16,85) = 2,728; p < 0.002; R² = 0.339]. The independent variables 
SOCIAL_NETWORK (β = 0.469; t = 4.907; p < 0.001), NO_OF_FOUNDERS (β = 0.280; t = 2.821; p < 
0.006), and DEG_ELITE (β = 0.216; t = 2.086; p < 0.040) predicted the FIN_ROUNDS. This model 
allowed us to test our hypotheses (H1–H5). We used the other models to ensure that significant independent 
variables were not masking the effect of other ones.  
We find that the educational institute, the number of founders, and the social network has a positive 
significant effect for all significant models. Given the fact that the coefficient for the social network was 
highly significant for all models, we ran additional models excluding this variable to test the robustness of 
Model 1. This analysis suggested a drop of the explanatory power of all models, as indicated by R2; 
however, three models still remained significant (Prob > F: < 0.05) and did not impact our final conclusion 
in any manner. However, Model 2, the model without the “SOCIAL_NETWORK” variable is not 
significant, and the adjusted R² is almost irrelevant (0.004). This suggests that this variable 
“SOCIAL_NETWORK” is an important predictor of access to VC financing for Indian startups. Our results 
support other studies that find the use of social media can influence overall firm performance, including the 
success of early-stage firms and their ability to obtain financing (Goh et al., 2013; Luo et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, it was found that the number of founders “NO_OF_FOUNDERS” tends to have significantly 
higher levels of influence in the number of finance rounds. This result also supports previous research that 
finds larger teams are likely to have access to more resources (Colombo & Grilli, 2005; Cooper & Bruno, 
1977; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Feeser & Willard, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).  
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Table 3: Regression analysis results (Models 1– 5)  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 expected 
sign Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. 
Educational 
Institute 
0.574* 0.216 0.040 0.422 0.159 0.174 0.602* 0.226 0.038    0.469+ 0.176 0.062 + H1 
(0.275)    (0.308)   (0.286)       (0.248)     
Number of 
Founders 
0.332** 0.280 0.006 0.330* 0.278 0.015       0.341** 0.287 0.006 0.318** 0.268 0.006 + H2 
(0.118)     (0.133)           (0.120)     (0.113)       
Years of 
Experience 
0.008 0.039 0.695 0.018 0.083 0.454 0.008 0.039 0.703 0.002 0.008 0.936 0.002 0.009 0.922 + H3 
(0.021)    (0.024)   (0.022)    (0.021)   (0.019)     
Prior technical 
exp 
-0.029 -0.011 0.912 0.224 0.085 0.438 0.171 0.065 0.514 0.038 0.015 0.885 0.006 0.002 0.979 + H4b 
(0.261)     (0.288)     (0.261)     (0.264)     (0.244)       
Prior founder 
exp 
0.186 0.073 0.481 0.115 0.045 0.698 0.312 0.122 0.250 0.321 0.126 0.219 0.143 0.056 0.551 + H4a 
(0.263)    (0.295)   (0.269)    (0.259)   (0.239)     
Prior 
consultant exp 
-0.210 -0.076 0.430 -0.069 -0.025 0.816 -0.092 -0.033 0.737 -0.188 -0.068 0.487 -0.245 -0.089 0.319 + H4c 
(0.265)     (0.297)     (0.272)     (0.270)     (0.245)       
Age 
-0.021 -0.037 0.708 0.012 0.022 0.845 -0.013 -0.023 0.822 -0.011 -0.019 0.848      + 
(0.056)    (0.063)   (0.058)    (0.057)         
Social 
Network 
0.000*** 0.469 0.000       0.000*** 0.468 0.000 0.000*** 0.446 0.000 0.000*** 0.434 0.000 + H5 
(0.000)           (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000)       
Gender 
0.399 0.120 0.202 0.061 0.018 0.857 0.380 0.114 0.242 0.394 0.118 0.217      ? 
(0.310)    (0.341)   (0.323)    (0.316)         
City 
Bangalore 
-0.491 -0.169 0.270 -0.337 -0.116 0.499 -0.459 -0.157 0.321 -0.208 -0.071 0.630       + 
(0.442)     (0.497)     (0.460)     (0.429)             
City NCR 
-0.386 -0.151 0.322 -0.298 -0.117 0.497 -0.296 -0.116 0.463 -0.139 -0.055 0.712      + 
(0.388)    (0.436)   (0.402)    (0.376)         
City Mumbai 
-0.475 -0.136 0.312 -0.360 -0.103 0.496 -0.422 -0.121 0.387 -0.175 -0.050 0.700       + 
(0.467)     (0.526)     (0.485)     (0.453)             
Consumer 
Internet 
-0.111 -0.043 0.742 -0.077 -0.030 0.838 -0.044 -0.017 0.899 0.040 0.015 0.906      + 




Table 3 (continued) 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 expected 
sign Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. Unst. β St. β Sig. 
Fintech 
-0.317 -0.071 0.523 -0.491 -0.110 0.379 -0.212 -0.047 0.680 -0.226 -0.050 0.654       + 
(0.494)     (0.555)     (0.512)     (0.502)             
HealthTech 
-0.075 -0.016 0.883 -0.050 -0.011 0.930 -0.126 -0.027 0.813 0.019 0.004 0.971      + 
(0.510)    (0.574)   (0.530)    (0.518)         
Edtech 
-0.141 -0.028 0.796 -0.003 -0.001 0.996 -0.079 -0.016 0.889 -0.103 -0.021 0.852       + 
(0.542)    (0.610)   (0.563)    (0.552)         
 
                      
Constant 
0.650  0.235 0.803  0.192 1.039  0.060 0.627  0.261 0.620  0.077  
(0.543)    (0.610)   (0.546)    (0.553)   (0.346)     
F 2.728    1.028   2.201    2.521   6.060     
Prob > F 0.002    0.435   0.012    0.004   0.000     
R2 0.339    0.152   0.277    0.305   0.311     
Adjusted R2 0.215    0.004   0.151    0.184   0.260     
                       
Notes: Non-standardized regression betas presented. Standard errors in parentheses. n = 102 
Unst. β – Unstandardized Beta; St. β – Standardized Beta; Sig. - p-value       





Surprisingly, our analysis indicates that exploratory variables related to the traditional signals of 
founder experience (the number of years or the type of prior experience) do not have significant impact on 
the number of financing rounds. This is contrary to prior research that finds founders’ industry experience 
to be valued (Brush et al., 2001), especially by VCs in making investment decisions (MacMillan et al., 
1985). We believe for investors in  developing economies where institutions are arguably weaker, informal 
quality signals may be much more important to mitigate information asymmetry. It is therefore possible 
that investors in new technology startups in India may place more value on networking and digital signals 
than traditional human capital signals.  
 
4.1 Results on Hypothesized Effects 
Here, we summarize the hypotheses test results, reported in Table 3. We used Model 1 to discuss our 
findings for the hypothesized main effects. All our hypotheses are directional. Our first 6 hypotheses are 
related to human capital and networks, and the last one to the strength of social or digital networking.  
H1 – not supported. Experienced founders are likely to access more rounds of VC financing. The number 
of years of experience a founder has is not significant in the access to financial capital through VCs.  
H2a – not supported. Founders who have prior startup experience are likely to access more rounds of VC 
financing. Prior startup experience of a founder is not significant in the access to financial capital through 
VCs. 
H2b – not supported. Technically experienced founders are likely to access more rounds of VC financing. 
Prior technical experience of a founder is not significant in the access to financial capital through VCs. 
H2c – not supported. Founders with prior business consultancy experience are likely to access more rounds 
of VC financing. Prior business consultancy of a founder is not significant in the access to financial capital 
through VCs. 
H3 – supported. Indian startups founders who obtain a degree from an elite educational institute are likely 
to attract more rounds of financing (Beta = 0.574, p < 0.01). We find that the educational institute has a 
significant positive impact on the number of financing rounds. 
H4 – supported. Indian startups that have more founders in their entrepreneurial team are likely to attract 
more rounds of financing (Beta = 0.332, p < 0.01). In line with previous research, we find that the number 
of founders has a significant positive impact on the number of financing rounds for Indian startups. 
This last hypothesis is related to social media networking. 
H5 – supported. Startups that have more followers (fans) on social media (Twitter/Facebook/LinkedIn) are 
more likely to receive more rounds of financing from investors (Beta = 0.000, p < 0.001). In accordance 





4.2 Robustness test 
We show in Figure 1 the general study model, including the major constructs of “human capital” 
and “social capital” together with the control variables. In our structured equation model, we present all 
variables that directly relate to the number of financing rounds. In general, we are able to verifiy that the 
relationship between the variables educational institute “DEG_ELITE,” the number of founders 
“NO_OF_FOUNDERS,” and social capital “SOCIAL_NETWORK” with financing rounds 
“FIN_ROUNDS” is significant (see Table 4). The high levels of association indicate that these three 
variables influence the number of financing rounds. The SEM results presented a Chi² (95) = 86.543, a 
practical significance = 0.720, R² = 0.360. 
 
Table 4: Regression Weights: Unstandardized, Standardized, and Significance Levels for Models in 
Figure 1 (Standard Errors in Parentheses; n = 102) 
   Unst. β St. β Sig. 
Fin_Rounds <-- Social_Network 0.000*** (0.000) 0.461 0.000*** 
Fin_Rounds <-- No_of_Founders 0.332** (0.106) 0.272 0.002 
Fin_Rounds <-- City_Bangalore -0.491 (0.383) -0.166 0.200 
Fin_Rounds <-- City_NCR -0.386 (0.339) -0.149 0.255 
Fin_Rounds <-- City_Mumbai -0.475 (0.412) -0.133 0.248 
Fin_Rounds <-- Age -0.021 (0.047) -0.037 0.654 
Fin_Rounds <-- Gender 0.399 (0.270) 0.118 0.139 
Fin_Rounds <-- EdTech -0.141 (0.481) -0.027 0.770 
Fin_Rounds <-- HealthTech -0.075 (0.439) -0.016 0.864 
Fin_Rounds <-- Consumer_Internet -0.111 (0.289) -0.042 0.701 
Fin_Rounds <-- FinTech -0.317 (0.434) -0.069 0.465 
Fin_Rounds <-- Years_Exp 0.008 (0.018) 0.038 0.643 
Fin_Rounds <-- Deg_Elite 0.574* (0.241) 0.209 0.017 
Fin_Rounds <-- Atleast_PriorFounder_Exp 0.186 (0.230) 0.071 0.418 
Fin_Rounds <-- Atleast_PriorTech_Exp -0.029 (0.223) -0.011 0.897 
Fin_Rounds <-- Atleast_PriorConsult_Exp -0.210 (0.228) -0.075 0.357 
Note: χ² (95) = 86.543; CFI > 0.95; RMSEA < 0.05; ***p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; +p<.10  
Unst. β – Unstandardized Beta; St. β – Standardized Beta; Sig. - p-value 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATION OF RESEARCH  
VCs confronted with information asymmetry are likely to look for certain signals to reduce 
informational gaps in the exercise of their judgement. This leads to the question, if information asymmetry 
is potentially heightened due to the continuously evolving nature of digital startups or the higher 
institutional burdens in certain countries, how would this affect the signals? We believe our research 
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contributes to extant literature as we link signaling theory to traditional human capital, networking, and 
social media networking in the context of the acquisition of VC funding by technology startups in a 
developing country with higher institutional burdens (Podolny, 1993, and 1994, and 2005; Spence, 1974). 
We build five main hypotheses (H1–H5). Our findings contain a series of larger implications for 
entrepreneurs, investors, and policy makers. To begin, our results suggest that traditional human capital 
factors may not necessarily serve as quality signals for technology startups in India, and other measures of 
entrepreneurial quality, such as quality of networks (networking signals) and social media networking 
(digital signals) may serve as better quality signals to access financing. The empirical analysis highlights 
the following main results. The first two main results are related to the role of traditional human capital in 
the funding of startups, in particular the work experience of the founder. Our empirical results suggest that 
years of experience do not impact the access of financing of a startup and neither do prior relevant 
experiences (as a founder, as a software engineer, or as a business consultant). A degree from an elite 
educational institute and the breadth of the entrepreneurial team are positively associated with the likelihood 
of access to financing. The third main result is related to the strength of social media networking on the 
studied startups. This result makes an important contribution to the signaling literature (as most of the 
current literature focuses on the developed nations of the US and Europe), especially from the perspective 
of emerging economies, since our study provides support for the changing importance of signals over time 
in the context of acquisition of VC financing and in the virtual world, where the impact of social media 
cannot be excluded. Indeed, out of all the digital signals, social media networking has the strongest impact 
on access to funding.  
When interpreting the results of our study, certain limitations need to be kept in mind. First, we 
have tested the impact of traditional human capital factors, networking, and social media networking on 
access to the financing of startups. However, in the actual decision-making process, certain other factors 
related to revenue growth rates or estimated market size or information about patents may play a role as 
well. Information for failed startups is absent. Second, our study is focused on India, and similar research 
on other emerging countries should be considered on topic. Third, we investigate the relationship between 
signal and financial resource acquisition and adopt a static approach (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; Higgins & 
Gulati, 2006). While our study provides important insights, finance acquisition is not a static process but 
rather a continuous process where different signals can play a different role at different stages. Some signals 
will be relevant for some stages but become irrelevant in subsequent stages. Thus, it would be interesting 
to develop a model that tests how different signals help the startup to acquire resources during different 
stages. Fourth, the study is mainly quantitative and lacks a qualitative view from investors as to what makes 
a strong signal during the financing rounds. Thus, we encourage future research that can consider 
integrating both qualitative and quantitative variables so that more understanding can be propounded into 
25 
 
the contingencies that enhance the financing of startups. Fifth, the validity and authenticity of the data are 
limited to what we have collected from multiple databases such as Traxn, Crunchbase, Techinasia, 
LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook. Even though we have sought to verify the information collected, there 
may still be a chance of some discrepancies, which cannot be avoided. Lastly, even though we establish 
causality relationships through our study, our work was done to support a set of postulated hypotheses; it 



































Acs, Z. J., & Audretsch, D. B. (1988). Innovation in large and small firms: an empirical 
analysis. The American economic review, 78(4) : 678-690.  
Acs, Z. J., Desai, S., & Hessels, J. (2008). Entrepreneurship, economic development and 
institutions. Small Business Economics, 31(3): 219-234. 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S.W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy of 
Management Review, 27(1): 17– 40. 
Ahlers, G., Cumming, D. J., Guenther, C., & Schweizer, D. (2015). Signaling in Equity 
Crowdfunding. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(4): 955-980. 
Aldrich, H. E., & Fiol, C. M. (1994). Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation. 
Academy of management review, 19(4): 645-670. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-
48543-8_5.  
Almus, M., & Nerlinger, E. A. (1999). Testing “Gibrat’s Law” for young firms: Empirical results 
for West Germany. Small Business Economics, 15(1): 1-12.  
Alsos, G., Isaksen, E., & Ljunggren, E. (2006). New venture finaning and subsequent business 
growth in men- and women-led businesses. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 30(5): 667-
687. 
Aral, S., Dellarocas, C., & Godes, D. (2013). Introduction to the special issue-social media and 
business transformation: A framework for research. Information Systems Research, 24(1): 3-13. 
Aspelund, A., Berg-Utby, T., & Skjevdal, R. (2005). Initial Resources' Influence on New Venture 
Survival: A Longitudinal Study of New Technology-Based Firms. Technovation, 25(11): 1337-
1347. 
Audretsch, D.B. (2007)a. The Entrepreneurial Society. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Audretsch, D.B. (2007)b. Entrepreneurship Capital and Economic Growth. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 23(1): 63-78. 
Audretsch, D.B., Acs, Z., & Strom, R. (2009). Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Audretsch, D.B., Bönte, W., & Mahagaonkar, P. (2012). Financial signaling by innovativenascent 
ventures: the relevance of patents and prototypes. Research Policy, 41(8): 1407-1421.  
Audretsch, D.B., & Lehmann, E. (2004). Financing High-Tech Growth: The Role of Banks and 
Venture Capitalists. Schmalenbach Business Review, 56(4): 340-357. 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:56:y:2004:i:4:340-357. 




Baron, R. A., & Ensley, M. D. (2006). Opportunity recognition as the detection of meaningful 
patterns: evidence from comparisons of novice and experienced entrepreneurs. Management 
Science, 52 (9): 1331-1344. 
Basu, A., & Parker, S. (2001). Family Finance and New Business Start-Ups. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 63(3): 333-358. 
Baum, J. A., & Silverman, B. S. (2004). Picking winners or building them? Alliance, intellectual, 
and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and performance of biotechnology 
startups. Journal of Business Venturing, 19 (3): 411-436. 
Baumol, W. J. (1996). Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive. Journal of 
business venturing, 11(1): 3-22. 
Bonini, S., Alkan, S., & Salvi, A. (2012). The effects of venture capitalists on the governance of 
firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(1): 21–45. 
Becker, G. S. (1993). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education. London: University of Chicago Press.  
Beckman, C. M., Burton, M. D., & O’Reilly, C. (2007). Early teams: The impact of team 
demography on VC financing and going public. Journal of Business Venturing, 22(2): 147-173.  
Bergh, D.D., & Gibbons, P. (2011). The Stock Market Reaction to the Hiring of Management 
Consultants: A Signalling Theory Approach. Journal of Management Studies, 48(3): 544-567. 
Bharadwaj, A., El Sawy, O. A., Pavlou, P. A., & Venkatraman, N. (2013). Digital business 
strategy: toward a next generation of insights. Mis Quarterly, 37(2): 471-482.  
Bhide, A. (1992). Bootstrap Finance: The Art of Start-Ups. Harvard Business Review, 70(6): 109-
117. 
Blau, P. M. (1977). Inequality and heterogeneity: A primitive theory of social structure. New York, 
NY: Free Press. 
Bonini, S., Alkan S., & Salvi, A. (2012). The effects of venture capitalists on the governance of 
firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(1): 21–45. 
Bonner, S., & Lewis, B. (1990). Determinants of Auditor Expertise. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 28, 1-20. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:28:y:1990:i::p:1-20. 
Brush, C., Greene, P. G., & Hart, M. M. (2001). From initial idea to unique advantage: The 
entrepreneurial challenge of constructing a resource base. Academy of Management Executive, 
15(1): 64-80.  
Burt, R.S. (1997). The contingent value of social capital. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2): 
339–365. 
Burton, M. D., Sørensen, J. B., & Beckman, C. M. (2002). Coming from good stock: Career 
histories and new venture formation. In M. Lounsbury, & M. J. Ventresca (Eds.), Research in 
the sociology of organizations (pp. 229-262). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 




Cao, J., & Hsu, P. H. (2011). The Informational Role of Patents in Venture Capital Financing, 
working paper, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1678809. 
Carter, R., & Van Auken, H. (2005). Bootstrap financing and owner’s perceptions of their business 
constraints and opportunities. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 17(2): 129-144.  
Cassar, G. (2004). The Financing of Business Start-Ups. Journal of Business Venturing, 19(2): 
261-284. 
Cassar, G., & Craig, J. (2009). An investigation of hindsight bias in nascent venture activity. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 24(2): 149-164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2008.02.003. 
Chandler, G., & Hanks, S. (1998). An examination of the substitutability of founders’ human and 
financial capital in emerging business ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 13(5): 353-369.  
Chatterji, A., Glaeser, E., & Kerr, W. (2014). Clusters of entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Innovation Policy and the Economy, 14 (1): 129-166.  
Chavis, L. W., Klapper, L. F. & Love, I. (2009). The impact of the business environment on young 
firm financing. World Bank Economic Review, 25(3): 486-507. 
Chen, H., De, P., & Hu, Y. J. (2015). IT-Enabled Broadcasting in Social Media: An Empirical 
Study of Artists’ Activities and Music Sales. Information Systems Research, 26(3): 513-531.  
Chevalier, J. A., & Mayzlin, D. (2006). The effect of word of mouth on sales: Online book reviews. 
Journal of marketing research, 43(3): 345-354. 
Chong, A., & Micco, A. (2003). The Internet and the Ability to Innovate in Latin America. 
Emerging Markets Review, 4(1), 53-72 
Clement, M. B. (1999). Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio complexity 
matter?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(3): 285-303. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-
4101(99)00013-0. 
Coleman, S. (2000). Access to capital and terms of credit: A comparison of men and women owned 
small businesses. Journal of Small Business Management, 38(3): 37-53.  
Colombo, M. G., & Grilli, L. (2005). Founders' human capital and the growth of new technology-
based firms: A competence-based view. Research Policy, 34(6): 795-816, 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:34:y:2005:i:6:p:795-816. 
Colombo, M. G., & Grilli, L. (2009). A capital partnership: how human and venture capital affect 
the growth of high‐tech start‐ups. Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance, 18(7‐
8): 231-239. 
Conti, A., Thursby, M. C., & Rothaermel, F. T. (2013). Show me the right stuff: signals for high 
tech startups. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 22 (2): 341-364. 
Cooper, A. C., & Bruno, A. V. (1977). Success among high-technology firms. Business Horizons, 
20(2): 16-23. 
Cooper, A. C., & Daily, C. M. (1997). Entrepreneurial team. In D. L. Sexton, & R. W. Smilor 
(Eds.), Entrepreneurship 2000. Chicago, IL: Upstart Publishing.  
29 
 
Cooper, A. C., & Gimeno-Gascon, F. J. (1990). Entrepreneurs, processes of founding, and new 
firm performance. Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences. 
Krannert Graduate School of Management. Purdue University. 
Corbett, A. C. (2005). Experiential learning within the process of opportunity identification and 
exploitation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29 (4): 473-491. 
Cosh, A., Cumming, D., & Hughes, A. (2009). Outside Entrepreneurial Capital. The Economic 
Journal, 119(540): 1494-1533. 
Crane, B., & Hartwell, C. J (2019). Global talent management: A life cycle view of the interaction 
between human and social capital. Journal of World Business, 54(2): 82-92. 
Cressy, R. (1996). Are Business Start-Ups Debt-Rationed?. Economic Journal, 106(438): 1253-
1270. 
Cumming, D.J. & Johan, S.A. (2007). Advice and Monitoring in Venture Finance. Financial 
Markets and Portfolio Management, 21(1): 3-43. 
Cumming, D. J. & Johan, S. A. (2008)a. Information Asymmetries, Agency Costs and Venture 
Capital Exit Outcomes. Venture Capital, 10(3): 197-231. 
Cumming, D. J., & Johan, S. A. (2008)b. Preplanned Exit Strategies in Venture Capital. European 
Economic Review, 52, 1209-1241.  
Cumming, D. J., & Johan, S. A. (2014). Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An 
International Perspective. Elsevier Science Academic Press. 
Cumming, D. J., Johan, S. A., & Zhang, M. (2014). The Economic Impact of Entrepreneurship: 
Comparing International Datasets. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2): 162-
178. 
Cumming, D. J., & Zhang, Y. (2016). Alternative investments in emerging markets: A review and 
new trends. Emerging Markets Review, 29, 1-23 
De Clercq, D., Danis, W.M., & Dakhli, M. (2010). The moderating effect of institutional context 
on the relationship between associational activity and new business activity in emerging 
economies, International Business Review, 19 (1): 85-101. 
Dellarocas, C., Zhang, X. M., & Awad, N. F. (2007). Exploring the value of online product reviews 
in forecasting sales: The case of motion pictures. Journal of Interactive marketing, 21(4): 23-45. 
Delmar, F., & Shane, S. (2006). Does experience matter? The effect of founding team experience 
on the survival and sales of newly founded ventures. Strategic Organization, 4(3): 215-247. 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1476127006066596. 
Eckhardt, J. T., Shane, S., & Delmar, F. (2006). Multistage selection and the financing of new 
ventures. Management Science, 52(2): 220-232. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20110500. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. (1990). Organizational growth: Linking founding teams, 
strategy, environment and growth among U.S. semiconductor ventures. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 35(3): 504-529.  
Elitzur, R., & Gavious, A. (2003). Contracting, signalling, and moral hazard: a model of 
entrepreneurs, ‘angels,’ and venture capitalists. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(6): 709-725. 
30 
 
Engel, D., & Keilbach, M. (2007). Firm-level implications of early stage venture capital 
investment – an empirical investigation. Journal of Empirical Finance, 14(2): 150-167. 
Ensley, M. D., Carland, J. W., & Carland, J. C. (1998). The effect of entrepreneurial team skill 
heterogeneity and functional diversity on new venture performance. Journal of Business and 
Entrepreneurship, 10(1): 1-14.  
Evans, S., & Bahrami, H. (1995). Flexible Re-Cycling and High-Technology Entrepreneurship. 
California Management Review, 37(3): 62-89. doi: 10.2307/41165799. 
Fairlie, R. W., & Chatterji, A. K. (2013). High‐Technology Entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley. 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 22(2): 365-389. doi:10.1111/jems.12015 
Feeser, H. R., & Willard, G. E. (1990). Founding strategy and performance: a comparison of high 
and low growth high tech firms. Strategic Management Journal, 11(2): 87-98. 
Florida, R. L., & Kenney, M. (1988). Venture capital-financed innovation and technological 
change in the USA. Research Policy, 17(3): 119-137, 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:17:y:1988:i:3:p:119-137. 
Forman, C., Ghose, A., & Wiesenfeld, B. (2008). Examining the relationship between reviews and 
sales: The role of reviewer identity disclosure in electronic markets. Information Systems 
Research, 19(3): 291-313. 
Fossen, F. M. (2014). Personal Bankruptcy Law, wealth, and entrepreneurship—Evidence from 
the introduction of a “Fresh start” policy. American law and economics review, 16(1) : 269-312.  
Gartner, W. B., Shaver, K. G., Gatewood, E., & Katz, J. A. (1994). Finding the Entrepreneur in 
Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 18(3): 5-9. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/104225879401800301.  
Gaskill, L. R., Van Auken, H. E., & Manning, R. (1993). A factor analytic study of the perceived 
causes of small business failure. Journal of Small Business Management, 31(4): 18-32.  
Ghose, A., & Han, S. P. (2011). An empirical analysis of user content generation and usage 
behaviour on the mobile Internet. Management Science, 57(9): 1671-1691.  
Gibbons, R., & Waldman, M. (2004). Task-specific human capital. American Economic Review, 
94(2): 203-207. 
Gimeno, J., Folta, T., Cooper, A., & Woo, C. (1997). Survival of the Fittest? Entrepreneurial 
Human Capital and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
42(4): 750-783. doi:10.2307/2393656. 
Gimmon, E., & Levie, J. (2010). Founder’s human capital, external investment, and the survival 
of new high-technology ventures. Research Policy, 39(9): 1214-1226.  
Goes, P. B., Lin, M., & Au Yeung, C. M. (2014). “Popularity Effect” in User-Generated Content: 
Evidence from Online Product Reviews. Information Systems Research, 25(2): 222-238. 
Goh, K.Y., Heng, C.S., & Lin, Z. (2013). Social media brand community and consumer behaviour: 
Quantifying the relative impact of user-and marketer-generated content. Information Systems 
Research, 24(1): 88-107.  
31 
 
Gompers, P. A. (2002). Corporations and the financing of innovation: the corporate venturing 
experience. Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 87(4): 1-18. 
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. (1999). What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?. National bureau 
of economic research. https://www.nber.org/papers/w6906  
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. (2001). The money of invention: how venture capital creates new 
wealth. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Granovetter, M.S. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 481–510. 
Greenberg, G. (2013). Small firms, big patents? Estimating patent value using data on Israeli start-
ups’ financing rounds. European Management Review, 10(4): 183-196.  
Groh, A. P., & Wallmeroth, J. (2016). Determinants of venture capital investments in emerging 
markets. Emerging Markets Review, 29, 104-132 
Gruber, M., MacMillan, I. C., & Thompson, J. D. (2008). Look before you leap: market 
opportunity identification in emerging technology firms. Management Sciences, 54(9): 1652-1665. 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). Multivariate Data Analysis. A 
Global Perspective. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S. (1993). Top Management Team Size, CEO Dominance, and Firm 
Performance: The Moderating Roles of Environmental Turbulence and Discretion. The Academy 
of Management Journal, 36(4): 844-863. http://www.jstor.org/stable/256761. 
Hall, J., & Hofer, C. W. (1993). Venture capitalists’ decision criteria in new venture evaluation. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 8(1): 25-42.  
Hambrick, D., & D'Aveni, R. (1992). Top Team Deterioration as Part of the Downward Spiral of 
Large Corporate Bankruptcies. Management Science, 38(10) : 1445-1466. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2632673. 
Hatch, N. W., & Dyer, J. H. (2004). Human capital and learning as a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 25(12): 1155-78. 
Häussler, C., Harhoff, D., & Müller, E. (2012). To be financed or not…-The role of patents for 
venture capital-financing. ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, (09-003). 
Häussler, C., Harhoff, D., & Müller, E. (2012). To Be Financed or Not – The Role of Patents for 
Venture Capital-financing. ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, (09-
003). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393725. 
Hayward, M. L. A., Shepherd, D. A., & Griffin, D. (2006). A hubris theory of entrepreneurship. 
Management Science, 52(2): 160-172. 
Higgins, M. C., & Gulati, R. (2006). Stacking the deck: The effects of top management 
backgrounds on investor decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 27(1): 1-25. 
Hochberg, Y. V., Ljungqvist, A., & Lu, Y. (2007). Whom you know matters: Venture capital 
networks and investment performance. The Journal of Finance, 62(1): 251-301. 
32 
 
Hoenen, S., Kolympiris, C., Schoenmakers, W., & Kalaitzandonakes, N. (2014). The diminishing 
signalling value of patents between early rounds of venture capital financing. Research Policy, 
43(6): 956-989.  
Hogarth, R. M. (1991). Judgement and choice: The psychology of decision. New York, NY: John 
Wiley and Sons.  
Hsu, D. H. (2007). Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture 
capital funding. Research Policy, 36(5): 722-741. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.02.022. 
Hsu, D. H., & Ziedonis, R. H. (2013). Resources as dual sources of advantage: Implications for 
valuing entrepreneurial‐firm patents. Strategic Management Journal, 34(7): 761-781. 
doi:10.1002/smj.2037. 
Hunsdiek, D. (1987). Unternehmensgründung als Folgeinnovation: Struktur, Hemmnisse und 
Erfolgsbedingungen der Gründung industrieller innovativer Unternehmen. Poeschel.  
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kaplan, S. N., & Stro¨mberg, P. (2004). Characteristics, contracts and actions: Evidence from 
venture capitalist analyses. Journal of Finance, 59(5): 2173-2206. 
Killeen, J., Turton, R., Diamond, W., Dosnon, O., & Wach, M. (1999). Education and the Labour 
Market: Subjective Aspects of Human Capital Investment. Journal of Education Policy, 14(2): 99-
116. 
Klapper, L., & Love, I. (2011). Entrepreneurship and development: The role of information 
asymmetries. World Bank Economic Review, 25(3): 448-453. 
Langelett, G. (2002). Human Capital: A Summary of the 20th Century Research. Journal of 
Education Finance, 28(1): 1-24. 
Lechler, T. (2001). Social Interaction: A Determinant of Entrepreneurial Team Venture Success. 
Small Business Economics, 16(4): 263-278. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40229157. 
Li, X., & Wu, L. (2018). Herding and Social Media Word-of-Mouth: Evidence from 
Groupon. Management Information Systems Quarterly, 42(4): 1331-1351. 
Li, C.; Shi, Y.; Wu, C.; Wu, Z. y Zheng, L. (2016). Policies of promoting entrepreneurship and 
Angel Investment: Evidence from China. Emerging Markets Review, 29, pp. 154-167. 
Luo, X., Zhang, J., & Duan, W. (2013). Social media and firm equity value. Information Systems 
Research, 24(1): 146-163.  
MacMillan, I. C., Siegel, R., & Subba Narasimha, P. N. (1985). Criteria used by venture capitalists 
to evaluate new venture proposals. Journal of Business Venturing, 1(1): 119-128.  
Maidique, M. A. (1986). Key success factors in high-technology ventures. In: D. Sexton, & R. 
Smilor, (Eds.), The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing 
Company.  
Mann, R. J., & Sager, T. W. (2007). Patents, venture capital, and software start-ups. Research 




Marcotte, C. (2012). Measuring entrepreneurship at the country level: A review and research 
agenda. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 25(3-4): 174-194. 
Marmer, M., Herrmann, B. L., & Dogrultan, E. (2011). Startup genome report extra: Premature 
scaling. Startup Genome, 10, 1-56. https://ruskline.ru/airee_s3.amazonaws.com/startupcompass-
public/StartupGenomeReport2_Why_Startups_Fail_v2.pdf 
McGrath, R. G., & MacMillan, I. (2000). The Entrepreneurial Mindset: Strategies for 
Continuously Creating Opportunity in an Age of Uncertainty. Harvard business school press. 
McMullen, J. S. (2011). Delineating the domain of development entrepreneurship: A market-based 
approach to facilitating inclusive economic growth. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(1): 
185-193. 
Mikhail, M., Walther, B., & Willis, R. (1997). Do Security Analysts Improve Their Performance 
with Experience?. Journal of Accounting Research, 35, 131-157. doi:10.2307/2491458.  
Miller, A. R., & Tucker, C. (2013). Active social media management: the case of health care. 
Information Systems Research, 24(1): 52-70. 
Nahata, R. (2008). Venture capital reputation and investment performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 90(2): 127-151. 
NASSCOM Startup India report 2017, Startup India-Momentous Rise of the Indian Startup 
Ecosystem, CII report on a snapshot of India’s Startup Ecosystem, Secondary sources, News 
article, 2017, https://smartnet.niua.org/sites/default/files/resources/nasscom-start-up-report-
2017.pdf 
Naude, W. (2010). Entrepreneurship, developing countries, and development economics: new 
approaches and insights. Small Business Economics, 34(1): 1-12. 
Parker, S. C. (2006). Learning about the unknown: how fast do entrepreneurs adjust their beliefs?. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 21(1): 1-26. 
Petersen, M., & Rajan, R. (1995). The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending 
Relationships. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2): 407-443. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118445.  
Podolny, J. M. (1993). A status-based model of market competition. American journal of 
sociology, 98(4): 829-872.  
Podolny, J. M. (1994). Market uncertainty and the social character of economic exchange. 
Administrative science quarterly, 39(3): 458-483. 
Podolny, J. M. (2005). Status Signals, a Sociological Study of Market Competition. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Reich, R. B. (1987). Reconsidered: the team as hero. Harvard Business Review, 65(3): 77-83. 
Ronstadt, R. (1988). The Corridor Principle. Journal of Business Venturing, 3(1): 31-40. 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbvent:v:3:y:1988:i:1:p:31-40. 
Sandberg, W. R., & Hofer, C. W. (1987). Improving new venture performance: The role of 




Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. American Economic Review, 51(1): 1-17. 
Sexton, D. L., Upton, N. B., & Wacholtz, L. E. (1997). Learning needs of growth-oriented 
entrepreneurs. Journal of business venturing, 12(1): 1-8.  
Shane, S. (2000). Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Organization Science, 11(4): 448-469. 
Shane, S., & Stuart, T. E. (2002). Organizational endowments and the performance of university 
start-ups. Management Science, 48(1): 154-171.  
Smallbone, D., Ram, M., Deakins, D., & Baldock, R. (2003). Access to Finance by Ethnic Minority 
Businesses in the UK. International Small Business Journal, 21(3): 291-314. 
Sorenson, O., & Stuart, T. E. (2001). Syndication networks and the spatial distribution of venture 
capital investments. American Journal of Sociology, 106(6): 1546-1588. 
Sorenson, O. (2003). Interdependence and adaptability: organizational learning and the long–term 
effect of integration. Management Science, 49(4): 446-463. 
Spence, A. M. (1973). Job market signalling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3): 355-374.  
Spence, A. M. (1974). Market Signalling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening 
Processes. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Spence, A. M. (2002). Signalling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets. 
American Economic Review, 92(3): 434-459. 
Stam, E., & Wennberg, K. (2009). The Roles of R&D in New Firm Growth. Small Business 
Economics, 33(1): 77-89. 
Storey, D. J. (2016). Understanding the small business sector. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Stuart, R. W., & Abetti, P. A. (1990). Impact of entrepreneurial and management experience on 
early performance. Journal of business venturing, 5(3): 151-162.  
Thurik, A.R., Carree, M. A., Van Stel, A., & Audretsch, D. B. (2008). Does Self-Employment 
Reduce unemployment? Journal of Business Venturing, 23(6): 673-686. 
Tyebjee, T. T., & Bruno, A. V. (1984). A model of venture capitalist investment activity. 
Management Science, 30(9): 1051-1066. 
Unger, J. M., Rauch, A., Frese, M., & Rosenbusch, N. (2011). Human capital and entrepreneurial 
success: a meta-analytical review. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(3): 341-358. 
Van Auken, H., & Carter, R. (1989). Acquisition of Capital by Small Businesses. Journal of Small 
Business Management, 27(2): 1-29.  
Vismara, S. (2016). Equity retention and social network theory in equity crowdfunding. Small 
Business Economics, 46(4): 579-590. 
Wang, L., & Wang, S. (2012). Economic Freedom and Cross-Border Venture Capital 
Performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 19(1): 26-50. 
Westhead, P., & Cowling, M. (1995). Employment change in independent owner-managed high-
technology firms in Great Britain. Small Business Economics, 7(2): 111-140.  
35 
 
Wiklund, J., & Shepherd, D. (2003). Knowledge‐based resources, entrepreneurial orientation, and 
the performance of small and medium‐sized businesses. Strategic Management Journal, 24(13): 
1307-1314. doi:10.1002/smj.360 
Zhu, F., & Zhang, X. (2010). Impact of online consumer reviews on sales: The moderating role of 






A1: Description of variables 
 
Variable Definitions 
 Dependent Variables 
Variable Name Description  
FIN_ROUNDS Multiple rounds of financing received by startups to July 
2018. This is a continuous variable. We obtained these data 
from Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
 
Independent Variables Related to Human Capital 
Variable Name      Description 
DEG_ELITE Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if at least one of the 
founders obtained an educational degree from an elite 
educational institute (top ranked from India and abroad) and 0 
otherwise. We obtained these data from LinkedIn. 
 
NO_OF_FOUNDERS Shows the number of founders for the startups in the sample. 
This is a continuous variable. We obtained this information from 
Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia. 
 
YEARS_EXP The average number of years of experience before starting the 
startup concerned. We obtained this information from LinkedIn. 
 
ATLEAST_PRIORFOUNDER_EXP Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one of the 
founders has had prior experience as the founder and 0 
otherwise. We obtained this information from LinkedIn. 
 
ATLEAST_PRIORTECH_EXP Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one of the 
founders has had prior experience as a technical engineer 
(software) and 0 otherwise. We obtained this information from 
LinkedIn. 
 
ATLEAST_PRIORCONSULT_EXP Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one of the 
founders has had prior experience as a business consultant and 
otherwise 0. We obtained this information from LinkedIn. 
 
 
Independent Variables Related to Social Media Networking 
 Variable Name Description 
SOCIAL_NETWORK This variable compiles the number fans following startups on 
multiple social media platforms 
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(LinkedIn+Twitter+Facebook). Information was obtained 
from the respective websites.  
 
Control Variables 
Variable Name Description 
CITY_BANGALORE Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the location of the 
startup is in Bangalore and 0 otherwise. We obtained this 
data from Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
CITY_NCR Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the location of the 
startup is in NCR and 0 otherwise. We obtained this data 
from Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
CITY_MUMBAI Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the location of the 
startup is in Mumbai and 0 otherwise. We obtained this data 
from Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
CONSUMER_INTERNET Dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the startup belongs 
to a consumer internet domain and 0 otherwise. We 
obtained this data from Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia  
 
HEALTHTECH Dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the startup belongs 
to healthtech and 0 otherwise. We obtained this data from 
Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
FINTECH Dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the startup belongs 
to fintech and 0 otherwise. We obtained this data from 
Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
EDTECH Dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the startup belongs 
to edtech and 0 otherwise. We obtained this data from 
Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
AGE Age of the startup measured in years at the end of the sample 
period [to] July 2018. We obtained these data from 
Crunchbase, Traxn, and Techinasia 
 
GENDER Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if one of the 
founders is male and 0 otherwise. We obtained this 
information from LinkedIn.  
 
